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Abstract 
 
There is still some lack of clarity regarding the question of what the Capability 
Approach actually is, how it should be interpreted and operationalised, and not least 
whether it is an adequate and useful concept for the analysis of social policy in 
Europe. Against the backdrop of these questions, this paper looks at recent 
contributions which use the Capability Approach (CA) for analysing social policy. 
This leads me to argue that the most interesting applications of the CA may not lie in 
policy evaluation in the classical sense, but rather in an analysis of policy outputs 
through the lens of concepts such as individualisation and diversity. In this sense, the 
CA may serve as normative foundation for addressing the dependent variable problem in 
comparative welfare regime research. In order to play this role, however, CA-
applications will need to clearly differentiate between the potential and implications 
of the CA itself, and various external normative reference points which should not 
be identified with the CA. 
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Introduction: The Capability Approach in social policy analysis1 
 
The Capability Approach (CA) is a set of ideas, concepts and methodological 
instructions which was developed mainly by Amartya Sen (e.g. Sen 1992; Sen 1999; 
Sen 2002), and subsequently other authors like Martha Nussbaum (e.g. Nussbaum & 
Glover 1995; Nussbaum & Sen 1993; Nussbaum 2003). Sen, an economist who in 
his discussions of Rawls and Townsend intensively engaged with and criticised 
philosophical theories of justice as well as measures of inequality, created a body of 
literature which was originally used mainly by development economists. Not least, it 
influenced the conceptualisation of the Human Development Index. In recent years, 
however, the concept has travelled and has been increasingly used for the analysis of 
social policy in economically advanced societies. It inspired the foundation of 
CAPRIGHT, a European research network dedicated to analysing social policy 
through the lens of the capabilities approach, and to a number of related 
publications. 
However, there is still some lack of clarity regarding the question of what the CA 
actually is, how it should be interpreted and operationalised, and not least whether it 
is an adequate and useful concept for the analysis of  social policy in Europe. This 
paper addresses these questions by examining some of the recent contributions, and 
concludes that the CA indeed has potential for analysing social policy in Europe. 
However, I argue that the most interesting applications of the CA may not lie in the 
currently pursued types of policy evaluation, but rather in an analysis of policy 
outputs through the lens of concepts such as individualisation and diversity. In this 
sense, the CA may serve as a normative foundation for addressing the dependent 
variable problem in comparative welfare regime research. Most importantly, 
however, in order to play such a positive role, CA-applications will need to clearly 
differentiate between the potential and implications of the CA itself, and various 
external normative reference points which should by no means be identified with the 
CA (although they can of course supplement it). 
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I introduce the five 
conceptual building blocks of the CA. This is followed by a section investigating 
how, in some research examples, normative reference points are linked with these 
building blocks, and why this may be problematic. I then go on suggesting that a 
normative position which is implicitly given within the framework of the CA can 
serve as a justification for addressing questions of individualisation and diversity, and 
show that this may be of help for addressing the dependent variable problem in 
welfare and social policy analysis. Finally, I try to position and distinguish this 
approach from other CA-applications on an abstract level.  
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The building blocks of the CA 
 
The CA is made up of five conceptual building blocks: Commodities, 
Conversion Factors, Capabilities, Choices, and Functionings (see Illustration 1). 
 
 
 
 
Illustration 1: The five building blocks of the Capability Approach 
 
 
Commodities  
Commodities are the resources the individuals can dispose of. Examples are 
money, or other material goods – a bicycle, a television, etc. Less material goods such 
as skills or habitual behaviour could also be conceived of as commodities. Measuring 
possession and non-possession of commodities is the standard procedure for 
producing measurements of monetary poverty or of multiple deprivation (e.g. 
Townsend 1993; Pantazis et al. 2006). The CA criticises the assessment of individual 
level outcomes based on commodities as “resourcist” and argues for measuring 
functionings instead of commodities. 
 
Functionings  
Functionings are what people really “do and are” and are considered a concept 
superior to commodities. This perspective is based on the view that individuals are 
fundamentally diverse, and that there are personal, environmental and social 
conditions which are the reasons for this fundamental diversity. In other words: 
because humans are not all the same, they require different (in terms of quantity as 
well as quality) commodities to achieve the same functionings. Measuring whether an 
individual is below 60% of median income, or whether an individual possesses a 
specific number of material items, does not necessarily allow one to reach 
conclusions about the individual’s well-being state. 
 
Capability set 
A capability set contains an individual's capabilities. Where functionings refer to 
what people really “do and are”, capabilities denote what people really “can do and 
can be”. Functionings, then, are a subset of the capability set. They are the 
materialised options or life chances of an individual. This conceptual distinction is 
based on the assumption that certain functionings are mutually exclusive, and that 
individuals (have to) exert choice. 
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The potential transformation of commodities into functionings is mediated by 
the social structures in place. Within the CA, these structures are dealt with under the 
heading of conversion factors, and, occasionally, in discussions of choice / agency.  
 
Conversion factors  
Conversion factors form the personal, environmental and social conditions of 
each individual existence. In the original approach as developed by Sen (Sen 1993; 
Robeyns 2005b), conversion factors are basically social structures in the widest 
possible sense. Sen’s standard example is the bicycle (a commodity) which is useful 
only if accompanied by the respective infrastructure, e.g. a bikeway (a conversion 
factor). Closer to the field of social policy, one could interpret certain acquired skills 
as a commodity, which are useful only if accompanied by respective labour market 
structures which help turn these skills into outcomes. Being qualified as a typesetter 
was useful in 1960, but not any more in 2010 when computers have replaced the 
traditional way of typesetting. A nursing degree acquired in India may have been 
recognised by British authorities between 2001and 2003, but not in 2009. How other 
personal characteristics such as intelligence or disability can be converted into 
functionings is also dependent on a set of institutional arrangements. Conversion 
factors are the place within the capability-approach to take into account all these 
structural effects which determine what and how commodities can be turned into 
functionings2. 
 
Agency / Choice 
Whereas the analysis of conversion factors usually refers either to external 
structures of the social world in general, or, sometimes, to the relevant policies that 
shape the conditions under which individuals can (not) capitalise on their 
commodities, the question of choice refers more to internal limitations and the 
question of agency. Sen himself notes that capabilities are both “the person's ability 
to do the things in question taking everything into account (including external 
constraints as well as internal limitations)” (Sen 2002, p.586). Where agency has been 
conceptualised within the framework of the CA, this has often lead to (and ended 
with) rather abstract discussions of internal constraints – such as the lack of desire to 
attain certain functionings 3. This problem is referred to as “adaptive preference 
formation” (Nussbaum 2001; Teschl & Comim 2005) and basically means that 
individuals living in situations of deprivation or oppression often adjust their 
expectations and aspirations downwards.4 
 
 
The CA and the question of normative reference points 
 
These building blocks have been used in various and very diverse ways to analyse 
individual level outcomes in relation to social and public policies, and at the end of 
this paper I sketch three different types of CA-applications which can be 
distinguished.  
One reason for the great diversity of CA-applications is certainly the fact that the 
CA has been combined with a large number of normative reference points. The 
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question of normative reference points is important, as CA-applications in the field 
of social policy are usually evaluative: they analyse policies with regards to the 
question whether they have (not) led to a number of normatively predefined goals. In 
the terminology of the CA, this means that they show (or assume) that a number of 
capabilities (or functionings) are important and valuable outcomes in a specific policy 
field, and then judge the policies (e.g. interventions into the conversion factors) with 
regards to their effect on individuals' ability to access these functionings. The fact 
that normative reference points are necessarily external to the CA framework is 
addressed by the following quote from Sen’s recent book “The idea of justice”:  
 
“Capability is, in fact, no more than a perspective in terms of which the advantages 
and disadvantages of a person can be reasonably assessed. (...) But neither justice, nor 
political or moral evaluation, can be concerned only with the overall opportunities and 
advantages of individuals in a society. The subject of fair process and a fair deal goes beyond 
individuals’ overall advantages into other – especially procedural – concerns. And these 
concerns cannot be adequately addressed through concentrating only on capabilities.” (Sen 
2009, p.296 f.) 
 
In other words, the question of a normative definition of valuable capabilities 
has to rely on CA-external reference points and procedures.  CA-applications in the 
area of social policy analysis have not fallen short of coming up with a diverse 
number of definitions of valuable capabilities. For the purpose of illustration, I will 
shortly describe three examples of recent social policy analyses which make use of 
the CA. This will show clearly that researchers engaged in analysing diverse policy 
fields come up with a great diversity of normative underpinnings. 
  
The contributions by Lewis (2004) and Hobson et al. (2008) analyse well-being 
in relation to the field of work-family-balance. They propose that caring is an as 
equally valuable functioning as labour-market participation, and therefore conclude that 
care and the opportunity to freely choose between care and labour market 
participation are to be taken as a normative reference point.  
 
The role of public employment services (PES) for the unemployed is the subject 
matter of the contributions by Bonvin and Farvaque (2006), Bonvin (2008) and the 
contributions of a special issue on activation policies and the capability approach (for 
an overview, see Bonvin & Orton 2009). The normative foundation of their analyses 
focuses on three functionings: Voice, i.e. the notion that benefit claimants are able to 
co-determine which services and benefits they can access; Capacities, i.e. the resources 
at hand for the employment service providers and which are crucial to enhancing the 
claimants' well-being states; Choice, i.e. that unemployed benefit claimants have as 
much choice as possible with regards to the various options they are offered by the 
employment service providers. Bonvin's normative starting point is his notion of 
“responsibility”. Only if claimants are equipped with sufficient resources (if 
employment service providers have sufficient capacities) and if they have a real 
choice between various options, they can reach “responsible” decisions. 
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Salais (2003, p.327 ff), in his account of the CA, looks at the role of the state in 
labour market processes, and especially at the role of social assistance and 
unemployment benefits. He emphasises the capability for work and the development of 
a respective ideal-typical “capability world”. In this hypothetical ideal-type, work 
would be considered a collective agency (not an individual disutility), and the 
rationale for assistance would be to equip people with adequate means to achieve 
“freedoms” (not only to compensate for a loss).  
 
The list of examples could easily be extended, but it is already evident that the 
diversity of normative reference points and definitions of what to consider a relevant 
and valuable functioning is immense.  
Beyond defining which capabilities or functionings should be considered 
valuable, a second normative question needs to be answered for most CA-
applications: is the goal equality of capabilities, or should the normative goal be rather to 
make sure that everybody is equipped with a number of basic capabilities? Many 
authors are unclear whether they are in favour of equal capabilities (which would 
require comprehensive regulation and redistribution) or in favour of basic capabilities 
(more in the vein of anti-poverty measures). Without going into further detail at this 
point, it should be noted that the question of equality vs. basic capabilities is another 
crucial normative decision, which, however, is not always discussed or justified 
sufficiently in writings on the CA5. 
 
This short list of examples shows that despite some attempts to formulate 
comprehensive and authoritative capability lists (Nussbaum 2003; Robeyns 2005a; 
Vizard & Burchardt 2007), most scholars come up with their own definitions of 
valuable functionings, depending on the specific policy field under investigation. 
Although I do not see much virtue in following authoritative capabilities lists, I 
would like to address the question of whether the sheer diversity of normative 
reference points and definitions of valuable capabilities may constitute a problem for 
the theoretical unity of the approach. This problem may arise, as I will show, if 
scholars identify the CA itself with their (externally derived) normative standards. 
Certainly each of the CA-applications can claim a number of good reasons and 
supporting background theories (e.g. responsibility, development, work-family-
balance, etc.) why their respective functioning(s) should be considered valuable (e.g. 
choices for the unemployed, the existence of democratic institutions, options for 
caring instead of labour-market participation, etc.).  
However, I argue that applications of the CA often fail to clearly spell out the 
external normative background justification for their choice of valuable functionings. 
To be precise, the problem is less that the normative justifications are not stated at 
all, but rather that they are justified with reference to the CA itself and not to CA-
external reasoning. This can lead to the crucial importance of the selection process of 
valuable functionings being downplayed. A common rhetoric is to present results or 
recommendations “from a capability perspective”, suggesting that the use of the CA 
(i.e. the terminology of the five building blocks) itself would make certain 
conclusions necessary – although the findings depend as much on the chosen 
normative reference point. My contention about this rhetoric is that a necessarily 
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normative selection process of relevant functionings is presented as a merely neutral 
process of scientific reasoning. To consider fulfilment through work, for example, as 
a valuable functioning may make perfect sense. It is the author's choice, however, to 
do so – and not an obvious choice from the perspective of the CA. On the contrary, 
I suggest that e.g. the contribution by Salais (2003) draws relatively little on the five 
conceptual tools of the CA, and instead uses some the CA- terminology to put 
forward his own persuasion that work should be considered a utility, and that a 
specific type of work – fulfilling, qualified work – should be promoted. The CA 
terminology adds little value to the presentation of this persuasion. A similar remark 
applies to some of the contributions in the special issue edited by Bonvin and Orton 
(2009).  
Although the above made comment may sound obvious to some, my 
observation is, however, that a number of studies indeed use the CA-terminology 
merely to put forward a particular, CA-external, normative stance. It is not always 
clear, then, whether the terminology of the CA is not complicating things rather than 
helping clarify matters.  These problems need to be kept in mind when answering the 
question whether the CA can play a positive role in social policy analysis. 
 
As Sen elaborates, the CA should actually be understood as anything but a 
normative theory of justice, but as a way of assessing individual human well-being. It 
is not a theory of justice (e.g. Robeyns 2005b; Sen 2009), and therefore doesn’t 
define the key components of the good life on a societal level. Different from 
Nussbaum’s approach (e.g. Nussbaum & Sen 1993; Nussbaum 2003), Sen and most 
proponents of the CA do not attempt to establish a list of indisputable capabilities 
which should be the key for all societies6.  
The problem which I try to sketch here is not about whether the CA embraces 
the “right” CA-external normative positions – the few above mentioned examples 
indicate that the CA can and is (rightly) being used in conjuncture with various goals 
and normative underpinnings. The question should rather be whether the CA serves 
any purpose beyond the reformulation of CA-external normative positions. Is the CA 
more and something else than merely a new terminology for saying what we deem 
good and desirable?  This leads me back to the above raised question: Does the 
diversity of normative underpinnings used in CA-analyses constitute a problem from 
the point of the CA? I do not think so – but only as long as the terminology of the 
CA is used for more than just paraphrasing (in a rather complicated way) the 
researcher’s own normative reference points.  
 
Beyond its contentious role as a normative justification for the selection of 
valuable functionings / capabilities, I argue that the CA is probably most valuable 
where it focuses on the concept of capabilities itself, be it in a negative form by 
showing why other forms of assessing individuals’ well-being states are deficient. In 
other words, the CA may come into its own wherever it serves as a basis for 
questioning simple commodities measurements in inequality or well-being research 
(e.g. by referring to human diversity), or where it questions purely subjective 
measures of functionings (e.g. by referring to the phenomenon of adaptive 
preference formation).  
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So far, I have stressed the original intention of the CA and showed that its 
application does not always live up to this intention, leading to various problems, 
first and foremost confusion on behalf of the readers. In the following, I will attempt 
to devise another interpretation of the CA which leads me to sketch another possible 
– and in my view even more interesting – way of using the CA in social policy 
research. 
The starting point is the following question: given that the selection of valuable 
capabilities and functionings appears to be a process which necessarily relies on CA-
external normative reference points, the question arises whether the CA could still 
also be interpreted as a normative concept, and whether it could even serve as a 
normative foundation on its own. In order to answer this question, in the following 
section I will reconsider the meaning of the CA's five building blocks described 
above. 
 
 
Investigating Diversity and Individualisation 
 
While some CA-applications wrongly identify their CA-external normative 
reference points with the CA itself, is this really because the CA is in itself an 
approach only concerned with the assessment of individuals’ life chances, as is 
claimed by Sen? Is there no normative position implicit in the framework of the CA? 
I am arguing that the CA could indeed be interpreted as a normative foundation 
for research questions, but will try to show that these may apply less to the selection 
of valuable outcomes (such as capabilities or functionings), but rather to the analysis 
of social policy outputs (such as the delivery of services). 
 
Individualisation as a result of the diversity of needs 
 
The CA's stress on the distinction between commodities on the one hand and  
capabilities and functionings on the other is an explicit reminder that the 
distribution of resources is not a good indicator for assessing individual well-being 
states (or policies directed at influencing them). People who are different will require 
different amounts of resources in order to reach the same goal (regardless of how 
this goal is normatively derived). Policies directed at changing conversion factors 
equally should not be expected to be effective if they are designed in a one-size-fits-
all fashion. One could therefore argue that the CA, by upholding the stress on 
human diversity, directs the attention to analysing policies in terms of individualisation. 
The CA is not primarily interested in investigating the question of how much 
resources are being spent in total but rather whether the resources are directed 
appropriately, taking the needs of the individual adequately into account. 
 
Diversity and plurality of choices 
 
The second important distinction which is established in the five building blocks 
is between capabilities and functionings. This distinction directs the attention to the 
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fact that there is often more than one approach to deal with problems, and more 
than one functioning which potentially could be attained. This eventually requires 
questions of agency to be addressed, or in other words, the question of whether there 
are impediments to substantively free choices between different options. First and 
foremost, however, this requires the establishment of the diversity of available options 
itself. 
 
Throughout this paper I have tried to uphold that the implications which unfold 
directly from the five building blocks of the CA should not be confused with those 
normative underpinnings which are derived from CA-external reasoning (and which 
may well be necessary, depending on the object of analysis and research strategy). 
However, as can be concluded from the above discussion, the five building blocks of 
the CA come with an implicit normative stance: the stress on human diversity, and the 
related emphasis on the concepts of diversity and individualisation, result in the 
implicit normative position that more individualisation and less standardisation is 
always better from the perspective of the CA. 
 
The various contributions in the volume edited by Clasen and Siegel (2007) 
centre on the question of how changing welfare state outputs should be measured, 
and substantiate the claim that traditional analyses of aggregate spending may not 
reveal those dimensions of the welfare state which are changing the most. In 
response to this observation, a number of answers are presented, which do not aim 
to be understood as best or definite solutions to this “dependent variable problem”, 
but rather as suggestions for a plurality of new and possibly complementary 
indicators. Clasen & Clegg (2007) for example come up with the notion of 
conditionality, whereas Kvist (2007) constructs a multidimensional indicator for 
social citizenship. I suggest that these contributions could be valuably complemented 
by the insight which is at the heart of the CA, namely that individuals are diverse, and 
have diverse needs and aspirations. This would lead away from the measurement of 
averages, of commonly or generally accessed benefits or services. On the contrary, it 
would require breaking down the recipients of public services and benefits into sub-
categories according to their different needs and risks, and address the question 
whether their different needs are met with differentiated, individualised policy 
responses – or whether standardisation and moves towards one-size-fits-all 
programmes are dominant developments within specific social policy areas. 
  
This strategy can be expected to be especially useful either in areas where people 
with very different risks find themselves grouped into the same category, or, on the 
contrary, where a heterogeneous group of people with nevertheless similar risks are 
split up into different programmes and categories. Both situations apply for example 
to the way non-employed (as opposed to unemployed) people are categorised and 
treated in welfare states. Whereas a high degree of fragmentation (e.g. into incapacity 
benefit recipients, “normal” long-term unemployed and people in early retirement) 
often leads to very different policy responses for the different categories (despite 
possibly similar “barriers to work” across all categories), the contrary is also often 
true: within one category (e.g. the “normal” long-term unemployed) programmes are 
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often standardised and not able to address the considerable degree of diversity of 
needs.  
 
The implicit normative position of the CA-perspective, then, would suggest that 
it is worthy investigating first and foremost the question of how individualised 
employment services are being delivered7, rather than primarily analysing their 
overall, average content, or the reciprocity requirements they come with 8.      
 
  
Meta-analysis of CA-applications in social policy analysis 
 
 
In the following I outline on a formal level how the questions of 
individualisation and diversity could be applied in social policy research. In order to 
better understand how this differs from other recent CA-applications, I classify CA-
applications according to their level of analysis: whether they focus on the analysis of 
outputs, of processes, or of outcomes.  
 
 
Level of 
analysis 
Purpose  CA- 
external 
normative 
foundation 
Examples 
Key words 
Outputs  Evaluation of 
policies 
No Do policies take diversity of needs into account?  
To what kinds of (alternative) functionings do policies 
promote access?  
How much choice do individuals have between 
alternative functionings? 
Individualisation, 
Plurality of options 
Outcomes  Assessing 
inequality.  
Yes Description of selected capabilities or functionings of 
individuals 
What is the range and quality of attained (or potentially 
attainable) valued functionings? What is the set of 
alternative functionings an individual does (or 
potentially can) attain? 
Capabilities, 
functionings 
Processes Evaluation of 
policies. 
Yes Do outputs translate into outcomes? Have policies 
promoted access to specific functionings?  
→ Likely independent variables: do policies take into 
account diversity of needs, are they individualised? Effectiveness 
questions 
 
Table 1: Schematic representation of different possible CA-applications 
 
 
On an abstract level, I suggest that the kind of analysis which can draw from 
normative foundations implicit in the CA framework can be classified as output-
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analysis without a CA-external reference point. In table 1, this option is represented in the 
first row. 
The CA in this sense can be seen as a foundation for framing research questions 
about what is interesting, important or distinctive about policies and possibly even 
configurations of policies (regimes). Guided by the CA, one would ask whether the 
provision of state services is individualised, how much scope exists to take diversity of 
needs into consideration, to what kinds of (alternative) functionings access is being 
promoted, and possibly also how much choice individuals have between those 
alternative functionings. All these questions relate, strictly speaking, to social and 
public policy outputs. I suggest that the CA may most usefully be applied in this way. 
 
The second row in table 1 represents another strategy, which is mainly 
concerned with using the CA for assessing individual well-being, or the social 
inequality thereof, for which the CA uses the concepts functionings and capabilities. 
As shown above, the emphasis on human diversity is at the root of the concept of 
functionings. If everybody had the same opportunities to capitalise on the possession of 
a certain number of material items, one could instead stick with the concept of 
commodities. In practice, the measurement of functionings will distinguish itself 
from the measurement of commodities by using more refined or complex indicators: 
for example, investigating job satisfaction is likely to be more important in this 
context than investigating employment status only. The second type of individual 
level outcome assessment which can be accommodated by the conceptual tools of 
the CA is the evaluation of capability sets (available choices), given a number of 
alternative functionings. This entails, strictly speaking, two questions: First of all, 
what kinds of alternative functionings are potentially attainable? And second: how 
many (real) choices do individuals have? Such analysis of capability sets can be a 
strategy for investigating situations where the assessment in terms of functionings 
does not tell the whole story. The investigation of capabilities is, however, more 
difficult than the assessment of functionings, as capabilities (the whole array of 
potential choices) is in principle unobservable. Whereas functionings are often 
analysed by means of quantitative data, it is therefore debatable whether the same is 
possible for the analysis of capabilities.  
Examples of the attempt to analyse functionings (without direct relation to 
policies) are the contributions by Tania Burchard and Polly Vizard. While the 
empirical investigation remains yet to be carried out, their work gives an overview of 
the methodological challenges and potentials of using the CA for investigating 
inequality in the UK. Their main aim is to develop an authoritative list of 
functionings based on the human rights framework (Burchardt & Vizard 2007; 
Vizard & Burchardt 2007). 
Beyond the question of measuring functionings, the contribution by Hobson et 
al. (2008) focuses on capabilities. They use a quantitative data set, the European 
Social Survey. To tackle the problem of unobservability, they analyse not only what 
choices people have taken, but also their aspirations (such as their preferred working 
hours, as opposed to their real working hours). The contribution of Zimmermann 
(2006), on the other hand, questions the potential of quantitative data and suggests 
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making more use of qualitative data for assessing the question of capabilities (a 
suggestion which yet has to be taken up).  
 
While these approaches are mainly concerned with measuring functionings in a 
very comprehensive way, most other CA-applications surveyed for this paper focus 
on a small number of functionings (or capabilities) deemed relevant and important in 
their respective policy areas, and use these to evaluate policies. This option is 
described in the third row. These approaches, which could be classified as focussing 
on “processes”, are mainly concerned with policy evaluation in the classical sense of 
investigating the effectiveness of policies with respect to a set of pre-defined 
capabilities or functionings. They rely on substantive choices regarding what is 
considered to constitute a valuable capability (which, as has been argued above, 
needs to be derived through CA-external normative justification), and ideally focus 
on capabilities rather than functionings.  
I suggest that this approach could be combined with the first approach sketched 
above, the “output”-oriented research strategy, where the questions which are 
addressed by the latter are being considered as potential independent variables: did 
the fact that certain policies do (not) take into account diversity of needs and a 
plurality of possible choices influenced the outcome (i.e. the existence of certain 
valued capabilities)? 
Most applications of the CA in the field of social policy are policy evaluations, 
whose approach can be classified as the third variant of table 1. This is true for all of 
the contributions already mentioned above (Lewis 2004; Hobson et al. 2008; Bonvin 
& Farvaque 2007; Bonvin 2008; Bonvin & Orton 2009), and likewise for the various 
contributions in the volume edited by Salais and Villeneuve (Salais & Villeneuve 
2004). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper I have suggested that the CA can serve a useful purpose for social 
policy analysis. Some contributions already make use of the CA's terminology for 
assessing policies in terms of their effects on the functionings or capabilities of 
individuals. While this approach certainly has its merits and potential, I argued that it 
also comes with a number of possible pitfalls, such as the sometimes arbitrary (and 
confusing) use of the capability terminology, which does not always add much value 
to the analysis, especially if the researcher shuns difficult to operationalise concepts 
such as capabilities and resorts to measuring commodities or functionings alone. A 
further problem is the tendency to portray the five building blocks of the CA as 
justification for the normative selection of capabilities, whereas the definition of 
valuable capabilities and functionings always needs to rely on CA-external reasoning. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the selection of valuable capabilities requires a CA-
external normative foundation, I suggested that the CA nevertheless comprises an 
implicitly normative position, which however applies less to the definition of valuable 
outcomes such as capabilities or functionings, but rather to qualify policy outputs.   
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I tried to show that the building blocks of the CA, with their crucial distinctions 
between commodities and capabilities on the one hand, and between capabilities and 
functionings on the other, put much emphasis on human diversity, i.e. the diversity 
of needs and plurality of choices. This emphasis can serve as the starting point for an 
analysis of policy outputs, focussing especially on the concepts of individualisation and 
diversity. 
Investigating outputs in this way may furthermore be an inspiration for 
addressing the dependent variable problem, directing the attention away from the 
measurement of averages and common regulations, and more towards questions 
such as how diverse needs and risks are being addressed by social policies, with their 
inherent need of standardisation through categorisation. 
In this way, I deem the CA a concept especially useful for the analysis of mature 
welfare states, although it was developed with economically developing countries in 
mind. The question of the individualisation of policies and programmes becomes 
more relevant particularly in countries in which social policy programmes and 
spending have become bigger, as they take on an ever more important role for the 
regulation of advanced capitalist economies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2010 ESPAnet conference (Urbino) and the 2010 
SPA conference (Edinburgh), and greatly benefited from the comments made. I would especially like 
to thank Rod Hick and Martin Pullinger for valuable comments. All remaining errors are the sole 
responsibility of the author. 
 
2 If conversion factors are the place in the CA to take into account all kinds of structural factors which 
lead to the development or the deprivation of capabilities (or functionings), this is also the place to 
locate the mechanisms which either alleviate or produce social inequalities. This is at odds with the 
interpretation of Dean (2009), who argues that the CA is structurally not able to conceptualise the 
production of inequalities in capitalism. He critiques the CA for not being able to address the 
exploitative power relations of capitalism and identifies the normative content of a number of CA-
applications (admittedly important ones, e.g. by Sen and Nussbaum) to be the restatement of the 
liberal ideal. While the CA is indeed being used to analyse outcomes on an individual level, Dean’s 
interpretation can however be rejected as this by no means obliges the researcher to remain confined 
to abstract concepts of the individual (as an “abstract bearer of freedoms”, Dean 2009, p.273). 
Otherwise, the CA would hardly have proven attractive for researchers interested in analysing gender 
inequalities (which couldn't be explained without going beyond a liberal abstraction of humans). 
 
3 A notable exception is the work from Hobson et al. (2008), who focus on aspirations such as 
preferred working time and contrast this with factual working times. 
 
4 The discussion of adaptive preference formation often remains very abstract in the context of the 
CA. With reference to the habitus-concept as developed by Bourdieu, one could argue that all 
preferences are adjusted to the respective social context. This, however, would require a more 
elaborate theory of agency than provided by the CA. See also the critique of Zimmermann (2006), 
who points out the underdeveloped conception of agency in Sen's work. 
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5 Sen, in his recent book, argues against an egalitarian standard (Sen 2009, p.295 f.). His position is not 
very convincing, however, as he rejects equality of capabilities by arguing that equality of a predefined 
functioning (in this case, a certain age threshold) would lead to un-equal treatment of patients 
(depending on their ageing prospects). Sen therefore rejects a certain type of equality by implicitly 
arguing for another type of equality (i.e. equal rights to get the best treatment). This discussion points 
again to the crucial process of defining valuable capabilities / functionings.  
 
6 Sen argues for the importance of public (democratic) deliberation for arriving at the capabilities 
which should be promoted in a society. Given that he himself considers the opportunity to participate 
in the democratic process a valuable capability, one could question whether this proposal for defining 
valuable capabilities is not paradoxical, and how this should happen in an undemocratic (or 
postdemocratic) society. Sen's call for public deliberation does not take into account that democracies 
do not automatically counteract durable inequalities, or promote capabilities for all its members (Dean 
2009, p.270). If the CA should potentially be of use to expose the lack of opportunities for 
democratic participation, is it wise to take (imperfect!) democratic deliberation as the decider on what 
needs to be changed? Gasper correctly notes that “one of the approach’s relatively empty boxes is 
called democracy” (Gasper 2007, p.344). 
 
7 The question of individualised employment services is taken up explicitly in a 2007 book titled 
“Making it personal : individualising activation services in the EU”  (Berkel & Valkenburg 2007) 
 
8  The sole focus on the content and reciprocity requirement is especially marked where research 
focuses on the question of “workfare” (e.g. Peck & Theodore 2000; Lødemel & Trickey 2000), 
often without addressing the question of the adequacy of public employment for various target 
groups, as opposed to other strategies (e.g. approaches focussing on training and qualification, etc.) 
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